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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE  
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0610  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1701  
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1175  
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0244  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC  
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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS  
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE  
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2113  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1494  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC  
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHLA/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001297

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DEPT FOR DS AND S/CT  
DEPT FOR SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2031  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [ASEC](#) [MARR](#) [KG](#) [PINR](#)  
SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE BISHKEK EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE  
ON SEPTEMBER 6 2006

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Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch for Reason 1.4 (c) and (d)

NOTE: THIS IS A REPEAT OF BISHKEK 1292, PROVIDING BROADER DISTRIBUTION.

¶1. (SBU) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on September 6, 2006 to review the disappearance of Major Jill Metzger, assigned to Manas Airbase. Present at the EAC were the DCM, RSO, POL/ECON, POL/RA, AID, DAO, PAS, CONS, MGT, RLA, GSO and Base Representative.

#### Background to the Incident

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¶2. (SBU) At approximately 1530 September 5, 2006, six personnel assigned to Manas Airbase departed the airbase to go to the central downtown Tsum Department store. The group arrived at Tsum at approximately 1615. At this time four members of the group walked to the Hyatt Hotel to exchange money. The group agreed to meet at 1700 and proceed to the restaurant. Major Metzger and Sgt Barnes (both female) entered Tsum at 1616 according to video evidence. Major Metzger was observed on four additional occasions on the Tsum CCTV. The last image was at 1629. At 1629 Major Metzger walked out of Tsum unaccompanied. Investigative review of the CCTV is ongoing. Multiple copies of the CCTV tapes are being reproduced for further investigative analysis.

¶3. (S) Major Metzger did not appear at a predetermined rally point in Tsum at 1700. Major Metzger was in possession of the only cell phone in the six-person group. At 1735 Sgt Barnes used the driver's cell phone to attempt to contact Major Metzger. Subsequent investigative development based on

cell phone traces placed Major Metzger,s cell phone in the vicinity of Bishkek,s Eastern Bus Station at 1735. Additional cell phone traces placed Major Metzger,s cell phone in the vicinity of the Tyngooch micro district in the southwest quadrant of Bishkek at 1907.

¶4. (S) At 1800 four base Office of Special Investigations (OSI) Agents passed by Tsum on their way to dinner and were stopped by members of Major Metzger,s tour group who informed them that she was missing. The OSI Agents and the tour group searched through Tsum,s 4 floors until 2000 and were unable to locate any sign of Major Metzger.

¶5. (SBU) At 2000 hours OSI Agents called ARSO requesting assistance.

¶6. (SBU) At 2010 ARSO notified FSNI and requested that FSNI contact police, militia, traffic police and patrol police and the office of crimes against foreigners to begin searching for Major Metzger.

¶7. (SBU) At 2015 ARSO notified RSO. RSO instructed ARSO to contact hospitals, morgues and the ambulance service. RSO requested ARSO to contact the DCM.

¶8. (SBU) At 2020 ARSO contacted DCM. DCM instructed ARSO to provide situational updates as they occurred.

¶9. (SBU) At 2050 DATT called ARSO and offered vehicular and personnel assistance if needed. The DATT recommended that ARSO contact the Ambassador.

¶10. (SBU) At 2100 OSI Agent,s met with Lieutenant Colonel Nurlan Sulanaliev from the office of crimes against foreigners and requested investigative assistance.

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¶11. (SBU) At 2115 ARSO contacted FSNI and requested a situation update. FSNI stated that all available law enforcement assets were assisting.

¶12. (SBU) At 2130 ARSO contacted RSO. RSO instructed ARSO to verify that roadblocks and vehicle inspections were being conducted on roads leading out of Bishkek. RSO requested ARSO to inquire into host nation,s canine support abilities. RSO also recommended ARSO notify the Ambassador and POL/RA.

¶13. (SBU) At 2150 ARSO notified Ambassador. Ambassador requested that ARSO contact POL/RA and recommended that ARSO contact DOS operations. Ambassador offered to contact host nation ministerial level officials.

¶14. (SBU) At 2200 ARSO contacted RSO. RSO recommended ARSO contact DS Command Center.

¶15. (SBU) At 2205 ARSO contacted DS Command Center and DOS Operations.

¶16. (SBU) At 2215 ARSO contacted POL/RA. POL/RA offered to contact National Security Service

¶17. (SBU) At 2245 ARSO and FSNI arrived at Tsum and requested to view CCTV. ARSO was advised that the Security Coordinator was not available until 0800 September 06, 2006 to assist with the CCTV investigation.

¶18. (SBU) At 0030 PAS contacted ARSO regarding the airbase recommendation for a monetary award. ARSO advised against the recommendation this early in the investigation. PAS also requested ARSO to provide a contact number at the Embassy for a tip line.

¶19. (SBU) At 0130 OSI contacted ARSO and stated that the Base Commander would contact the Ambassador regarding the proposed monetary reward.

¶20. (SBU) At 0135 DCM contacted RSO to request update on the situation.

¶21. (SBU) At 0200 Ambassador contacted RSO to inquire about the proposed monetary award. RSO advised that it was too early in the investigation to recommend a monetary award. Ambassador also stated she would chair a meeting of the EAC at opening of business.

¶22. (S) At 0730 Joint Prisoner Recovery Agency (JPRA) contacted RSO office and stated that a Repatriation Team (one female psychologist and one female SERE (Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape) specialist) would arrive on September 08, 2006. Additionally, OSI briefed that a support team of 22 agents will arrive in the next few days.

¶23. (SBU) At 0810 ARSO and FSNI met OSI at Tsum to review CCTV.

¶24. (SBU) At 0945 OSI and host nation investigators began questioning Tsum tenants.

¶25. (SBU) At 1010 the Ambassador chaired a meeting of the EAC. The EAC reviewed the facts of the case and agreed to take the following actions:

Prepare a factual statement announcing the disappearance of an individual from the base, develop a checklist of precautionary steps Amcits should take as the investigation proceeded, and issue this information to Embassy staff, to

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Peace Corps Volunteers, to all Amcits via a Warden message, and the two local schools where dependent children are enrolled. In addition, the Ambassador, in coordination with the base, agreed to hold a press conference with Kyrgyz television media to outline the incident and appeal to the public for information leading to finding Major Metzger. Embassy has taken all of the actions outlined above.

¶26. (SBU) At 1100 ARSO and FSNI filed an Official Claim on the behalf of the Airbase with the Sverdlozsky District Police station, requesting cooperation in the investigation of the incident.

¶27. (S) At 1130 host nation investigators began search of the East Bus Station and Tyngooch Micro district based on the information obtained from the cell phone traces.

¶28. (S) At 1600 FSNI informed RSO section that the last individual called by Major Metzger is possibly a Kyrgyz male. Host country law enforcement will conduct interview.

¶29. (SBU) Over the course of the day, the Ambassador called Acting Foreign Minister Kadyrov, SNB Chairman Tabaldiyev, Minister of the Interior Satalinov, and the President's Deputy Chief of Staff Sadyrkulov to thank them for the outstanding cooperation of the Kyrgyz law enforcement organizations and request continued assistance in the on-going investigation.

¶30. (SBU) Embassy Bishkek will continue to support the investigation as requested by the airbase. Post is still evaluating the LEGATT in Almaty offer to provide an advanced Fly Team (4 agents and support personnel who set up a Situation Command Center) and a Hostage Negotiation team from the Crisis Negotiations unit. FBI support is dependent upon request from the Ambassador. Host nation has trained hostage negotiators and are prepared to assist as needed. RSO section, OSI and host nation continue to investigate the disappearance and follow-up on all leads. RSO section formally requested investigative assistance from all host nation law enforcement entities as required in accordance with Kyrgyz law.  
YOVANOVITCH